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Cult skewed research in failed bioterror attack
One needs only to look to Japan for the potential threat of research findings falling into the wrong hands.
And Paul Keim is no stranger to investigating incidents in which science is used for nefarious purposes.
Long before the first anthrax letter attack in the United States, Keim was investigating an attempted terrorist attack in which the Aum Shinrikyo released aerosolized anthrax over Tokyo.
Keim determined the cult had acquired a veterinary vaccine strain of anthrax that it attempted to modify in a lab based on available research. The cult then used a modified steam generator to release anthrax spores into the Tokyo sky over several days. There were no serious injuries from the incident and the investigation concluded that the dispersal incident had little possibility of endangering human life.
The failure to send anthrax aloft didn’t stop the Aum Shinrikyo. The cult acquired sarin gas and carried out several terrorist attacks in Tokyo subways, the most serious on March 20, 1995. During the bustle of morning rush hour, cult members released the sarin gas on five trains, killing 12 people and injuring more than 5,000 commuters.
As governments around the world work to keep biological weapons out of the hands of terrorists and Asia continues to sit atop the list for confirmed cases of avian influenza, releasing research on a highly contagious and potentially catastrophic flu virus is matter for serious consideration. |
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Scientific journals urged to redact
deadly avian flu research
An international debate is churning over releasing research results detailing the mutation of the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, making it more transmissible between animals and humans.
The A/H5N1 avian influenza virus has posed a serious public health concern since its identification in Asia in 1997. The virus has a 60 percent mortality rate in humans, but because it wasn’t airborne it was not easily spread. But a team of scientists has changed that. The team has created an avian flu 5.0—five mutations of the virus made it airborne, highly contagious and capable of a pandemic of massive proportions—and release of
the findings has come to a screeching halt as
high-level conversations on public safety take place around the world.
An expert on pathogens and bioterrorism, NAU Regents’ Professor Paul Keim released a statement this week in his capacity as acting chair of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity recommending redaction of portions of the scientific findings and warning of the unusually high magnitude risk from unrestricted publication.
Keim said the request to redact the results is a watershed moment. "I don't think any researcher has ever been asked not to publish important results." Click here to listen to his interview on NPR's "Morning Edition."
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Keim also serves as director of NAU’s Center for Microbial Genetics and Genomics and director of TGen's Pathogenic Genomics Division.
“Our concern is that publishing these experiments in detail would provide information to someone or some organization or government that would help them develop similar mammal-adapted influenza A/H5N1 viruses for harmful purposes,” the statement said. “A pandemic or the deliberate release of a transmissible highly pathogenic influenza would be an unimaginable catastrophe for which the world is currently inadequately prepared.”
Keim said the pending release of the research findings has stimulated a broad conversation on consequences of such experiments, and that
while the results may be useful to guide vaccine efforts, “a balance must be struck between academic freedom and protecting the greater good of mankind from potential danger.”
Several months ago, Keim and the board took up the task at the request of the federal government to review the research to weigh the implications for dual use and potential consequences of its release to the public.
Since then, the ensuing debate on publishing or redacting the research findings has been the subject of inquiry in The Wall Street Journal, The Chronicle of Higher Education, The New York Times, Reuters, The Los Angeles Times and hundreds of other news outlets around the world.
Amid the growing deliberation, research teams involved in the A/H5N1 experiments, led by the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and the University of Wisconsin, Madison, last week announced a voluntary 60-day moratorium on publishing their findings in Science and Nature to allow further discussion.
The World Health Organization is expected to host a global summit on research oversight and policy this month in Geneva.
The full statement issued by U.S. National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity is available online in Science and Nature.
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