

Competitive No More: The Arizona First Congressional District Race

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In an environment where congressional elections are typically noncompetitive and election outcomes are known before election season begins, a competitive race draws national attention. Such was the 2004 Arizona First Congressional District election. There was so much promise for an exciting race, and so much national attention focused on the district in the pre-election season. Once election season was underway, however, the First District election moved from the “competitive election” column to the “safe incumbent seat” column. The story of this movement begins with an exploration of the District’s unique features.

Demographics

The defining feature of the Arizona First Congressional District is its enormity. This district covers more than 58,000 square miles of land, about half the size of the entire state of Arizona. Equal in size to the state of Illinois, it is the largest congressional district of any state that includes more than one district. Candidates must travel long distances to meet people, because it takes nine hours to drive across the district, and no single media market reaches the entire district.

The population of the district is quite diverse. When first constituted following the 2000 U.S. Census, the district was 58 percent white, non-Hispanic, 23 percent American Indian, and 16 percent Hispanic.¹ Today the district has a Democratic registration advantage (43 percent), compared to Republicans (34 percent), Independents (23 percent), and Libertarians (0.5 percent).² The district is predominantly rural in nature. The largest city in the district is Flagstaff, with a population of just 61,000.³ The economic base of the district includes tourism and a large service sector, a significant scientific community (geologists, astronomers), a university community (Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff), copper and coal mining interests, and ranching. The population of the district also includes a large number of retirees.

Brief History of the Arizona First Congressional District

Arizona gained two congressional seats after the 2000 census. Republican Rick Renzi defeated Democrat George Cordova in the district’s inaugural election in 2002.⁴ This led the national party committees and political pundits to identify the First District seat as one of the most competitive of the 2004 election.

The Candidates

The congressional election featured three candidates: the incumbent Republican, a Democratic challenger, and a Libertarian candidate. Only the Republican and Democratic candidates ran viable campaigns.

Democrat. The Democrats were left scratching their heads about their loss of the First District race in 2002. The general consensus among Democrats was that too many candidates had run in the 2002

¹ Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, “Final Congressional Plan” (www.azredistricting.org/?page=finalcong) [Nov. 18, 2004].

² Arizona Secretary of State, “Arizona Voter Registration Count (as of 10/25/2004),” (www.azsos.gov/election/) [Nov. 18, 2004].

³ Flagstaff City Government, “Flagstaff Community Profile,” (www.flagstaff.az.gov/index.asp?NID=2) [Nov. 18, 2004].

⁴ Frederic I. Solop and James I. Bowie, “The 2002 Arizona First Congressional Race,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, vol. 36 (July 2003), p. 3.

primary, splitting the vote seven ways and allowing George Cordova to win with just 22 percent of the vote. Cordova was an unknown candidate who won the primary largely due to grassroots campaigning within Native American and Hispanic communities. Subsequently, he was unable to raise significant money after the primary and was unable to attract much support from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC).⁵

Having learned from the 2002 race, Democratic Party officials determined that the party would be better served if it cleared the primary field. They rallied behind one candidate, concentrating limited resources behind the person they deemed most electable, a decision some later viewed as a strategic error.⁶ The Democrats decided to support the candidacy of Paul Babbitt, despite the fact that several candidates from the 2002 race (George Cordova, Fred DuVal, and Diane Prescott) kept their Federal Election Commission (FEC) files active while they contemplated running again in 2004. Babbitt had many assets. His family had deep roots in Flagstaff; their business interests drove the city's economic development for over a century. His brother, Bruce Babbitt, was a former governor of Arizona and Bill Clinton's Secretary of the Interior. Paul Babbitt was involved in local and county politics for twenty-five years, serving on the Flagstaff City Council and as Mayor of Flagstaff, and he had been serving as a member of the Coconino County Board of Supervisors since 1986.

In November 2003, the Democratic Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano, and Jim Pederson, Chair of the State Democratic Party, held a reception for Babbitt.⁷ This reception was widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Babbitt's candidacy. George Cordova and Diane Prescott dropped out of the race soon after the event. Babbitt became the de facto Democratic candidate. He was later opposed by local activist Bob Donahue in the primary, but Donahue ran little more than a symbolic campaign. Babbitt won the Democratic primary with 74 percent of the vote.

Republican. The Bush Administration strongly supported Renzi's candidacy in 2002, and Renzi entered Congress with a firm commitment to the president's agenda. In return, Bush and the Republican Party were determined to help Renzi retain his seat in 2004. They gave him important committee assignments and an unusually large number of federal earmarks for his district. In 2004, Renzi ran unopposed in the Republican primary.

Matthew Ash, Renzi's press secretary, said Renzi's reelection strategy was about "being everywhere at once."⁸ In two years of representing the First District, Renzi had opened eight district offices, held 70 town hall meetings, traveled more than 100,000 miles in the district, answered more than 30,000 letters from constituents, and claimed to have brought more than \$140 million into all parts of the district. The campaign touted Renzi as "Rural Arizona's Workhorse" in its advertising.

The contrast between Renzi and Babbitt could not have been greater. Renzi, a former football star at Northern Arizona University, is gregarious and outgoing. Babbitt, on the other hand, is reserved and soft-spoken, with a demeanor more characteristic of a librarian than a politician. Renzi is one of the most conservative members of Congress, voting with the president 93 percent of the time and with his party 91

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Harriet Young, chairperson, Coconino County Democratic Party, telephone interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 3, 2004.

⁷ Mark Shaffer, "State Dems Touting Paul Babbitt in 1st Congressional District Race," *Arizona Republic*, November 16, 2003, p. B7.

⁸ Matthew Ash, press secretary, Office of Congressman Rick Renzi, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 10, 2004.

percent of the time.⁹ He received the highest possible rating from the National Right to Life Committee, voted 90 percent of the time with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and received an “A” rating from the National Rifle Association (NRA). Renzi also advocated withdrawing from the United Nations and sponsored a bill to remove Arizona from the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.¹⁰ Babbitt, on the other hand, ran as a relatively liberal candidate. He was pro-choice, supported environmental protection, opposed the Bush tax cuts, and was critical of the U.S. presence in Iraq. On his front porch in Flagstaff, he flew the United Nations flag next to the Stars and Stripes.

Money

The 2002 First District election cost an unprecedented amount of money for a congressional election in rural Arizona, but, the money spent in the 2002 election was easily overshadowed by the general election expenses of the 2004 race.

Candidate

Both major-party candidates were well funded and raised significantly more money in the 2004 election cycle than in 2002. In 2004, Renzi raised \$2.3 million, compared to \$1.7 million in 2002, and Babbitt raised \$1.3 million, compared to the \$665,000 raised by George Cordova in 2002 (see table 14-1).

As is typical for an incumbent, Renzi raised a significant amount of money early in the election cycle and a majority of his money (51 percent) came from PACs (see table 14-1). Sixty percent of his PAC money came from the business community. One-third of his PAC money (31 percent) came from single issue/ideological groups, with most of this money being donated by leadership PACs and candidate committees.¹¹

Babbitt, in contrast, struggled to get on solid ground with a professional campaign organization. After declaring his candidacy in October 2003, Babbitt cycled through two campaign management teams before settling on campaign manager Frank Costanzo, former Arizona state director of the Howard Dean campaign, at the end of June 2004.¹² Consequently, the Babbitt campaign got off to a slow start in raising money.

As of the November 22, 2004 FEC filing, two-thirds of Babbitt’s money (67 percent) came from individuals, and 32 percent came from PACs. Labor PACs contributed \$194,500 to Babbitt’s campaign, or 46 percent of Babbitt’s total PAC money.¹³

Party

The First District race was targeted as a high priority for both Democrats and Republicans. Both parties planned on injecting significant money and star power into this race. Although President Bush did not come to the district for Renzi as he did in 2002, Vice President Cheney held a March fund-raiser for Renzi in Phoenix. Babbitt benefited from John Kerry’s August appearance in Flagstaff and was the

⁹ Project Vote Smart, “Congressman Rick Renzi,” (www.vote-smart.org/bio.php?can_id=MAZ21558 [November 18, 2004]).

¹⁰ Seth Muller, “Renzi Takes a Far Right Turn,” *Arizona Daily Sun*, July 18, 2004, p. A1.

¹¹ Federal Election Commission, “2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info,” November 22, 2004 (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 21, 2004]).

¹² Frank Costanzo, campaign manager, Paul Babbitt Campaign, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 10, 2004.

¹³ Federal Election Commission, “Money in Politics Database: Paul J. Babbitt, Jr.,” (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candpg.exe?DoFn=H4AZ01111*2004 [January 5, 2005]).

primary beneficiary of a May Democratic fund-raiser featuring Hillary Rodham Clinton in Phoenix. According to FEC filings, the DCCC invested approximately \$1.1 million in independent expenditures to get Babbitt elected.¹⁴ FEC records indicate that \$888,244 was spent advocating Babbitt's election, and \$244,281 was spent for ads against Renzi (see table 14-2). State Democrats did not directly invest in Babbitt's campaign. The DCCC also lent organizational support to Babbitt, helped him identify capable staff members, and provided him with district data via the National Committee for an Effective Congress.¹⁵ Given that Arizona was initially defined as a battleground state for the presidential election, state Democrats chose to invest in a coordinated campaign that utilized staff personnel and limited resources to mobilize likely Democratic voters in support of a slate of Democratic candidates.¹⁶

The Republican Party, by way of the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), invested more in the First District race than the Democratic Party. FEC records indicate that the national Republicans invested about \$1.6 million in the race.¹⁷ Just \$60,394 of that money was spent advancing a positive message about Renzi (see table 14-2). The rest of the money was spent on negative ads attacking Babbitt. State Republicans also allocated a limited amount of resources to a coordinated campaign that advocated casting votes for a slate of Republican candidates.¹⁸

Interest Groups

The Babbitt campaign was supported by union interests, including an endorsement from the United Steelworkers of America, and environmental interests, such as the Sierra Club and the Arizona League of Conservation Voters. While making public endorsements of Babbitt's candidacy, these groups invested few dollars in the Babbitt race. The 527 organization MoveOn.org chose Babbitt as one of only four House candidates to receive its endorsement and special attention. The organization itself did not donate money to the Babbitt campaign or spend money on behalf of getting Babbitt elected, but MoveOn did provide a link on its web site to the Babbitt campaign web site. According to Frank Costanzo, Babbitt's campaign manager, this effort did yield a small but significant amount of cash for the campaign.¹⁹ Costanzo lamented that some 527 activity may actually have hurt Babbitt. Medical marijuana advocates endorsed Babbitt and spent some money on his behalf, but, according to Costanzo, this activity may have lost more votes than it gained.²⁰

Renzi was supported by a coalition of business interests as represented by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB). The NRA worked on Renzi's behalf as well. The largest expenditures made by an interest group active in the First District race were from the National Association of Realtors (NAR). NAR invested over \$462,000 in the effort to have Renzi reelected, according to FEC records.²¹ They distributed thirteen mail pieces to voter homes and sponsored one newspaper ad and one TV ad (see table 14-4). The NAR ads were largely positive, focusing on Renzi's work to make home ownership more affordable. No mention was made of Babbitt.

¹⁴ Seth Muller, "Babbitt Claims DCCC Didn't Rebut Smear Campaign," *Arizona Daily Sun*, November 4, 2004, p. A1.

¹⁵ Greg Speed, communications director, DCCC, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 15, 2004.

¹⁶ Sara Rosen, communications director, Arizona State Democratic Party, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 9, 2004.

¹⁷ Muller, "Babbit Claims DCCC Didn't Rebut Smear Campaign," p. A1.

¹⁸ John Echols, Northern Arizona Field Coordinator, Arizona Republican Party, interview with Frederic I. Solop, November 4, 2004.

¹⁹ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

²⁰ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

²¹ Muller, "Babbit Claims DCCC Didn't Rebut Smear Campaign," p. A1.

Effect of Money

Money is an important resource for all electoral campaigns. The salient question for the First District is “How should money be allocated so as to maximize its usefulness in such a physically large and demographically diverse election district?”

Ground Campaign

Babbitt’s strategy emphasized his work as a local official in Flagstaff and Coconino County, contrasting him with Renzi, who was portrayed as an outsider beholden to special interests.²² This message was also emphasized in Babbitt’s ground campaign. Ultimately, the Babbitt campaign itself placed more hope on a ground campaign than did Renzi’s campaign. This occurred primarily because Babbitt began the election campaign with less name recognition than Renzi and less money to promote name recognition. Also, Babbitt had less media experience and was not an effusive, charismatic figure in front of the camera. His campaign was slow in getting organized, and Babbitt did not immediately receive the media training he needed.²³ Finally, much of the Republican ground campaign was orchestrated by the NRCC, rather than by the Renzi campaign.

Much of the Democratic ground campaign was ceded to others. Democrats were very interested in registering new voters. They hoped that efforts by America Coming Together (ACT), a national 527 organization with staff and resources in Arizona, would benefit their candidates.²⁴ This hope may have been misguided. In the end, ACT could not distinguish between registering Republicans and Democrats. Also, there was no follow-up mechanism by the organization to understand whether newly registered voters actually cast a vote in the election.²⁵

The Babbitt campaign surrendered other aspects of the ground campaign as well. Kerry’s campaign forces initially targeted Arizona as a battleground state. They invested money and staff in the state, hoping to add Arizona to their column. At the same time, state Democrats organized a coordinated campaign to elect Democrats into offices at all levels throughout the state. According to Frank Costanzo, Babbitt’s campaign manager, state Democrats turned over the direction of the coordinated campaign to the Kerry forces who brought money and staff personnel to the state. When Kerry appeared in front of thousands of supporters in Flagstaff in August, Babbitt took his place next to him on the stage, but weeks later, the Kerry campaign pulled out of Arizona in the face of poor poll numbers. As Kerry reallocated resources to other states, the Arizona Democratic Party’s coordinated campaign faltered, and Babbitt’s organization suffered.²⁶

The Babbitt campaign and supporters were active in distributing mail pieces throughout the campaign. Nine mail pieces came out of the Babbitt campaign, while thirteen mail pieces were independently produced and distributed by the DCCC (see table 14-4). Babbitt allies produced another fourteen pieces.

Renzi’s election strategy relied more on an air campaign than did Babbitt’s. Renzi was well organized at an earlier date and had a significant amount of early money to purchase media time in Phoenix and throughout the district. Moreover, Renzi’s camp proved to be very strong in terms of direct mail. Fifty pro-Renzi or anti-Babbitt mail pieces were distributed, compared to the thirty-six pieces distributed by

²² Carlos Viscarra, assistant campaign manager, Paul Babbitt for Congress Campaign, interview by Frederic I. Solop, November 8, 2004.

²³ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

²⁴ Young interview, November 9, 2004.

²⁵ Young interview, November 9, 2004.

²⁶ Costanzo interview, November 10, 2004.

Babbitt and his allies (see table 14-4). Of the fifty Renzi pieces, three came from the Rick Renzi for Congress campaign, four were campaign-like mailings funded by taxpayers under public franking privilege that came out of Renzi's office, seventeen originated from the NRCC, one came from the Arizona Republican Party, and twenty-five were sent by Renzi allies.

The NRCC mailers, in particular, set a negative tone in the election. These pieces hammered Babbitt's record in local politics, painting him as a tax-and-spend liberal. Flagstaff's *Arizona Daily Sun* criticized the NRCC charges as misleading and inaccurate, but other media failed to investigate.²⁷

Renzi made strides to reach out to constituencies he had failed to carry in 2002. He sought to establish a foothold on the Navajo Nation, for example, where he had lost badly to Cordova in 2002. He played up the federal money he was able to bring to the reservation and met frequently with tribal leaders. He was received much more warmly by the Navajo than he had been two years earlier. Renzi was even given an honorary Navajo name meaning, "man with many children" (Renzi has twelve children). The Navajo Nation Council unanimously endorsed Renzi's candidacy, a testament to Renzi's ability to win over a traditional Democratic group. A few days later, however, in an apparent attempt to cover their bases, Navajo leaders also endorsed Babbitt, though not unanimously.

Finally, district residents reported a flurry of push-polling activity that seemingly emerged from allies of both candidates.²⁸ According to the American Association of Public Opinion Research, "A push poll is a form of negative campaigning disguised as a political poll that is designed to change opinions, not measure them."²⁹ Large numbers of Arizona First District voters answered calls disguised as measuring election attitudes and were then treated to invectives about either one candidate or the other. For instance, one automated call from "USA Public Opinion Group" claimed that Renzi was supporting a plan by President Bush for "a new national sales tax on everything." The funding sources behind this push-polling could not be identified.

Air Campaign

Babbitt's air campaign began on the radio with a country jingle that took subtle swipes at Renzi for his alleged Virginia residency. This song was played on stations throughout the large district. Radio is relatively cheap way to reach the more isolated areas of the huge district, and both candidates ran a number of radio ads.

Despite radio's pervasiveness, the big money was ultimately spent on TV ads in the Phoenix market. Although Phoenix is not in the district, its TV stations reach most of the district's population. As in 2002, Renzi and the NRCC both unleashed a TV blitz of negative advertising against the Democratic opponent. While Babbitt was able to buy more TV airtime than George Cordova had in 2002, his campaign was still vastly outspent by the Republicans. The Babbitt campaign and the DCCC combined to spend about \$375,000 to run four unique TV ads, while Renzi, the NRCC, and the NAR combined to spend \$815,000 for ten unique ads (see table 14-3).³⁰

²⁷ Randy Wilson, "Spin Zones Are No Way to Cover Post-debate Reaction," *Arizona Daily Sun*, October 10, 2004, p. A7; See also, "GOP Stuck on Irrelevant Babbitt Tax Votes," *Arizona Daily Sun*, October 11, 2004, p. A1.

²⁸ Seth Muller, "When is a Push Poll a 'Message Test'?" *Arizona Daily Sun*, September 21, 2004, p. A1.

²⁹ American Association of Public Opinion Research, "APOR Statement on Election Year 'Push Polls'," (www.aapor.org [January 5, 2005]).

³⁰ These spending figures account for ad buys on four television stations. The campaigns may have spent additional money for ads on other television stations.

Babbitt's TV ads continued the general theme of his campaign, touting his deep Arizona roots while repeating the charges that Renzi actually lived in Virginia and did not truly represent the district. Renzi bought a house in Flagstaff shortly before his 2002 campaign, but his wife and school-age children continued to reside in the Virginia suburbs of Washington D.C., where they had lived for over a decade. At times, though, the Babbitt campaign's concern with Renzi's place of residency seemed to overshadow Babbitt himself. Renzi responded saying he went to high school in Arizona, was the team captain for Northern Arizona University's football team in the election district, and operated several Arizona businesses. The final vote suggests that the "carpetbagger" attacks did not resonate with district voters.

Renzi's TV campaign began in the summer with positive ads pushing Renzi's "workhorse" image. They emphasized his success in bringing federal money to the district. By October, though, the Republican TV effort turned negative. The ads from the NRCC repeated accusations against Babbitt seen in earlier mail pieces. In the final weeks of the campaign, Renzi himself also went negative, mocking Babbitt's support for wind energy and water conservation projects as concern with "windmills and flowers." The final Renzi ad contained the most negative and emotionally powerful message. In it, a Native American woman choked back tears as she claimed that dust from "Paul Babbitt's mine" had given her breast cancer. The Babbitt campaign responded that he held only a small stake in the gravel mining operation and there was no evidence to support her allegation. Nonetheless, the powerful emotional message of the ad captured the attention of district voters.

Unique Circumstances of Results During Election

There are two unusual situations that dominated the First District race. One situation is the power of incumbency. Renzi entered the 2004 race with a track record of bringing new federal money into all parts of the district. He regularly traveled the district, was more well known than his opponent, and he had the full support of the Republican National Committee (RNC), the NRCC, the White House, and business interests. Most incumbents were reelected to office in 2004, and Renzi's win was not unexpected.

On the strength of his record, Renzi pulled out to an eleven-point lead over Babbitt in April, and he held on to that lead into September. Republican attacks on Babbitt, though, pushed Renzi over the top. October polls, taken in the midst of the negative barrage against Babbitt, showed Renzi with what would prove to be an insurmountable twenty-three-point lead. This margin was built in large part by a drop in support for Babbitt, with little increase in Renzi's numbers. In the end, Renzi overwhelmed Babbitt with a twenty-three-point win. Babbitt was unable to survive the combination of Renzi's service to the district and a barrage of negative advertising.

As the first incumbent representative of the new all-rural district, Renzi had a unique advantage. The people of the district were accustomed to being largely ignored by their previous representatives, who tended to focus on the state's more urban areas. Any attention Renzi gave to his constituents, therefore, was a welcome change, and they were grateful for it. Renzi's image was inevitably bolstered, making it easier to promote the theme that he was the district's "workhorse."

The second unusual situation explains, in part, Renzi's twenty-three-point win. Babbitt did not prove to be an effective candidate. Unlike the 2002 race, State Democrats united behind Babbitt's campaign early in the season. They cleared the field of other candidates and avoided a challenging primary election. However, Babbitt missed an important opportunity to sharpen his message and develop his presentation as a strong candidate. In addition, the Babbitt name was not as well regarded throughout the district as state Democrats had hoped, and it took a long time for Babbitt to pull together an experienced campaign team. Ultimately, Babbitt's message did not resonate throughout the district. Babbitt's weaknesses were highlighted by the fact that Kerry outpolled Bush by 6,700 votes in Coconino County, yet Babbitt, who

resides in the county and represented the area for many years as a county supervisor, won the county by just 112 votes. Babbitt failed to win any of the other counties in the district.

Conclusion

The story of the 2004 First District election was ultimately anticlimactic. The spirited race that both sides expected failed to materialize, as the incumbent Renzi proved to be stronger than anticipated. At the same time, Babbitt fell far short of expectations. When Arizona itself failed to maintain its status as a presidential battleground state, national attention drifted elsewhere, and the Arizona First Congressional District race became an afterthought to national Democrats.

Renzi entered the race with a significant amount of money. He had the freedom to make early media buys and to define his opponent early in the election season. In the end, the Renzi camp relied on the traditional Republican approach of defining his opponent as a tax-and-spend liberal who was out of touch with the politics of the district. This message was most prominent in the NRCC advertising, but the Renzi campaign used this message as well. Renzi's strategy also involved highlighting his track record as a tenacious, hard-working representative who brought money into all parts of the congressional district. Spring 2004 polling by the Social Research Laboratory at Northern Arizona University showed that this message resonated throughout the district. When presented with information about Renzi bringing more than \$130 million of new federal projects into the First District, one-third of likely voters (33 percent) said they were more likely to vote for his reelection.³¹

Babbitt narrowly focused on issues from the 2002 election and centered his campaign on defining Renzi as a "carpetbagger." This was a more difficult claim to make in 2004, given Renzi's two-year track record of service to the district. Babbitt ultimately failed to make a persuasive argument as to why district voters should unseat an incumbent and place their bets on a new representative. Social Research Laboratory polling also showed that the Babbitt name translated into a net loss of votes in many parts of the congressional district, despite state Democratic officials uniting behind his candidacy. Twenty-eight percent of likely voters said that information about the Babbitt family made them less likely to vote for Babbitt while just 20 percent said it made them more likely to vote for Babbitt.³² Ironically, Renzi, the alleged outsider, was better able to project the rugged, independent image that rural Arizonans found appealing while Babbitt, despite his familial roots in the district, failed to connect with the district's voters.

Because so many congressional seats in the nation are noncompetitive, the competitive seats garner significant attention. In the First District, traditional campaign tactics brought a seemingly competitive district into uncompetitive status. What was unique in the First District race was that the original "competitive" label was based on assumptions about district composition rather than actual data about voter attitudes. In the final analysis, freshman Representative Rick Renzi was reelected and, provided he is able to continue bringing money into the district, will likely solidify his hold on a district that Democrats once considered to be rightly theirs.

³¹ Social Research Laboratory, "Renzi Leads Babbitt in Arizona 1st Congressional District Race," (www4.nau.edu/srl/News.aspx?Year=2004 [January 5, 2005]).

³² *Ibid.*

Table 14-1
Candidate Receipts and Expenditures, Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2003-04

	Paul Babbitt (D)	Rick Renzi (R)
From PACs	\$418,984	\$1,193,645
From individuals	\$867,850	\$836,792
From party	\$9,500	\$10,032
From candidate	\$0	\$0
Other contributions	\$2,196	\$282,924
Total receipts	\$1,298,530	\$2,323,393
Total expenditures	\$1,258,337	\$2,184,925
Cash on hand (as of 11/22/04)	\$40,193	\$136,847

Source: Federal Election Commission, "2003-04 U.S. House and U.S. Senate Candidate Info," November 22, 2004, (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_candidate.exe?DoFn=&sYR=2004 [December 21, 2004]).

Table 14-2
Independent Expenditures by Party Committee, Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2003-04

Party Committee	Race	Candidate	Independent Expenditures FOR	Independent Expenditures AGAINST	TOTAL	Party Total
DCCC	AZ 1	Paul Babbitt	\$888,244	...	\$888,244	\$1,132,525
	AZ 1	Rick Renzi	...	\$244,281	\$244,281	
NRCC	AZ 1	Paul Babbitt	...	\$1,543,878	\$1,543,878	\$1,604,272
	AZ 1	Rick Renzi	\$60,394	...	\$60,394	

Source: Federal Election Commission, (<ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/> [January 5, 2005]).

Table 14-3
The Air War: Television and Radio Advertising Expenditures,
Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization	TV	Radio	Total \$ Spent	CMAG TV
Democratic allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Paul Babbitt for Congress	\$213,665	\$10,321	\$223,986	\$528,915
<i>Political parties</i>				
DCCC	\$161,639	...	\$161,639	\$1,056,199
Republican allies^b				
<i>Candidates</i>				
Rick Renzi for Congress	\$367,351	\$7,994	\$375,345	\$1,368,468
<i>Political parties</i>				
NRCC	\$292,275	...	\$292,275	\$1,487,106
<i>Interest groups</i>				
National Association of Realtors	\$156,250	...	\$156,250	\$497,522
American Hospital Association	...	\$6,668	\$6,668	...
Small Business Survival Committee	...	\$1,260	\$1,260	...
National Right to Life	...	\$470	\$470	...

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005); and Campaign Media Analysis Group data.

^a Please see appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. The ad-buy data collected for this study may contain extraneous data because of the difficulty in determining the content of the ads. The parties or interest groups that purchased the ad buys possibly ran some ads promoting House, Senate, or presidential candidates or ballot propositions not in the study’s sample but still within that media market. Unless the participating academics were able to determine the exact content of the ad buy from the limited information given by the station, the data may contain observations that do not pertain to the study’s relevant House, Senate, or presidential races. For comparison purposes the CMAG data is included in the table. Because of the sheer volume of TV and radio stations and varying degrees of compliance in providing ad-buy information, data on spending by various groups might be incomplete. This table is not intended to represent comprehensive organization spending or activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table with table 14-4.

^b Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

Table 14-4
Number of Unique Campaign Communications by Organization,
Arizona 1st Congressional District Race, 2004^a

Type and Organization ^b	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Democratic allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Paul Babbitt for Congress	9	2	2	3	8	2	26
<i>Political parties</i>							
DCCC	13	2	15
Arizona Democratic Party	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
JustGoVote.org	6	2	8
Arizona League of Conservation Voters	1	1	2
National Education Association	2	2
National Right to Work Committee PAC ^d	2	2
New House PAC	2	2
Sierra Club	2	2
We the People	2	2
Arizonans for Medical Marijuana	...	1	1
Democratic Advancement PAC	1	1
ITC Research	1	1
MoveOn.org ^e	1
New Democratic Network ^f	1
USA Public Opinion Group	1	1
Republican allies^c							
<i>Candidates</i>							
Rick Renzi for Congress	3	2	...	2	2	7	16
Congressman Rick Renzi (taxpayer expense)	4	4
<i>Political parties</i>							
NRCC	17	1	...	3	21
Arizona Republican Party	1	1
Yavapai County Republican Committee	...	1	1
<i>Interest groups</i>							
National Association of Realtors	13	1	1	15
U.S. Chamber of Commerce	3	...	1	4
The Seniors Coalition	2	1	3
National Federation of Independent Business	2	2
National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund	1	1	...	2
National Right to Life	1	1	...	2
United Seniors Association	1	1	2
Alliance for Quality Nursing Home Care/ American Health Care Association	...	1	1
American Hospital Association	1	...	1
Diné for Renzi	...	1	1
Eagle Forum PAC	1	1
Jim Lamerson – Prescott, AZ	...	1	1
National Association of Home Builders	1	1

Type and Organization ^b	Mail	Newspaper/ Magazine	Personal Contact	Phone Call	Radio	TV	Total Unique Ads
Small Business Survival Committee	1	...	1
Veterans of Foreign Wars PAC	1	...	1
Nonpartisan							
<i>Interest groups</i>							
AARP ^f	1	1

Source: Data compiled from David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, "2004 Campaign Communications Database," (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005).

^a See appendix A for a more detailed data explanation. Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. A more complete picture can be obtained by examining this table together with table 14-3.

^b All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization's activity. For instance, Arizona Education Association data have been included in the National Education Association totals.

^c Certain organizations that maintained neutrality were categorized according to which candidates their ads supported or attacked or whether the organization was openly anti- or pro- conservative or liberal.

In blank cells, "..." only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium.

^d Organization that attacked Republican Rick Renzi, but did not support Democrat Paul Babbitt either in the Arizona First Congressional District. This organization usually endorses Republican candidates.

^e Endorsed Paul Babbitt and helped raise money for his campaign; See MoveOn.org, "MoveOn Members Endorse: All Candidates," (www.moveonpac.org/candidates.html [December 21, 2004]).

^f Unspecified race media advertising. Simon Rosenberg, president, New Democratic Network, interview by David Magleby and Betsey Gimbel, Washington, D.C., December 15, 2004.

^g Organization released a nonpartisan voters guide. This organization usually endorses Democratic candidates.